In this paper we develop a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium overlapping generations (OLG) model with health as a durable good to study the life-cycle behaviors of health care spending and financing. We show that a calibrated version of our generalized Grossman model is able to match the life-cycle trend of insurance take up ratios and average medical expenditure from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) data in 2004/05. We then apply our model to analyze the macroeconomic implications of a counter factual health care reform in the U.S., using a system of universal health insurance vouchers. Our results suggest that health insurance vouchers are able to extend insurance coverage to the entire population but they also increase aggregate spending on health. More importantly, we find that the positive insurance effect (efficient risk pooling) dominates the negative incentive effect (tax distortions and moral hazard) which results in significant welfare gains for all generations when a payroll tax is used to finance the voucher program. In addition, our results suggest that the choice of tax financing instrument and accounting for general equilibrium adjustments are critical in determining the performance of the voucher program.
Introduction
The Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) from 2004/2005 reveals distinct life-cycle patterns for health expenditures and health insurance take up rates (see figure 1 ). The first pattern indicates an increasing trend in health expenditures over the life-cycle, i.e. the young spend on average less than 10 percent of their income on medical services whereas the old spend more than half of their income on average on health care services. The second pattern shows that private health insurance take up rates exhibit a hump shaped pattern over the life-cycle. Young individuals tend to have relatively low private insurance take-up ratios (around 40 percent). These ratios increase gradually and peak at the age of 55 at around 70 percent. Thereafter, the fraction of private insurance holders drops as individuals become qualified for public health insurance at the age of 65.
These patterns are indicative of the salient features of household spending on health care and how this spending is financed over the life-cycle. More importantly, these patterns reveal the lifecycle aspects of two fundamental problems in the U.S. health care system: (i) the low insurance coverage rates and (ii) the ever increasing health expenditures. Indeed, these problems have put the U.S. health care system under great pressure in recent years as they burden employers and households due to the prevalence of employer provided health insurance, and the government due to the insolvency of public health insurance programs like Medicare and Medicaid. Furthermore, the situation has been aggravated as the aging of the American population has accelerated which makes comprehensive reform of the U.S. health care system more urgent.
Understanding the life-cycle behavior of health care spending and financing provides a key to understanding the problems of the current U.S. health care system as well as the effects of a potential health care policy reform. The overall goals of this paper are: (i) to construct that an augmented incomplete markets and heterogenous agents model with endogenous health expenditures and health insurance choice that can generate the life-cycle patterns of insurance take-up ratios and health spending observed in the data; and (ii) to quantify the macroeconomic effects of a comprehensive health insurance reform using health insurance vouchers on the economy's resource allocation, welfare and government budget.
To that end, we first develop a stochastic overlapping generations (OLG) model with health as a durable good. We base the model on the Grossman model of health capital and construct two model versions: a simple dynamic partial equilibrium model and a full dynamic general equilibrium model. The simple dynamic model with endogenous health is used to analytically explore how insurance and health spending decisions interact with consumption and savings decisions. This setting specifically models the way that the health insurance and spending decisions are confounded with the savings and human capital accumulation decision which makes the two-period setting more intricate than the simple one period settings of classical insurance papers like Pauly (1968) . We show that low income agents are less likely to buy health insurance as are low risk agents. This implies that the demand for health and health insurance varies strongly with age. That is, young individuals, who are less exposed to health risk and have low income spend less on health and are less willing to buy health insurance; On the other hand, old individuals, who are exposed more to health risk and have relatively higher income, spend more on health and are more willing to buy health insurance.
Next, we extend our model to a more realistic multi-period overlapping generations model that accounts for general equilibrium channels such as equilibrium prices, interactions between health insurance markets and other financial markets, and tax financing instruments. We calibrate our full dynamic model to the U.S. economy and quantitatively explore individual decision making on health care, health insurance, and medical expenditure over the life-cycle. We find that a calibrated version of our generalized Grossman model is capable of producing the life-cycle trends of average medical expenditures and insurance take-up rates that we find in the data.
Second, we use our model to analyze a health insurance reform using a universal medical voucher program, which allows individuals to purchase health insurance from private insurance companies with funds provided by the government. We focus on how the introduction of a universal public health insurance program would affect the U.S. economy and whether such a program would be able to increase the number of people with health insurance while simultaneously decreasing aggregate health care spending. The voucher program works as follows. Each year an individual receives a voucher to purchase insurance coverage from private insurance companies for the next year. The size of the voucher is based on the individual's current medical condition. The government runs an experience rating system that estimates the expected health expenditure of an individual for the next period. The government issues a voucher of that exact size to the individual. A sick person will therefore receive a larger voucher than a healthy person. Insurance companies compete for the vouchers of patients. Participants can switch plans every year. The annual budget for health vouchers is fixed by the government as a share of GDP. Medicare, Medicaid, and employerbased health insurance tax breaks are eliminated. 1 This voucher program would completely replace Medicare and employer provided (tax free) health insurance. The voucher reform we have in mind is motivated by the discussion in Kotlikoff (2007) and Emanuel and Fuchs (2007) and is purely counter factual.
Our simulation results indicate that the reform has significant effects on economic aggregates and welfare. More specifically, our results from our first experiment where we use a payroll tax to finance the vouchers suggest that a voucher system would result in full coverage of the U.S. population but also increases the share of GDP spent on health care by 0.6 percent. The main driver behind the increase in health spending is a moral hazard effect. Simultaneously, we observe a certain amount of crowding out of savings that leads to lower long-run capital stocks. As GDP falls the health expenditure to GDP ratio increases even further. We summarize these effects under the umbrella of negative efficiency effects due to the publicly financed voucher system. On the other hand we also observe a complete disappearance of adverse selection effects as insurance is automatically available to the entire population. This leads to improvements in risk pooling and higher levels of health. Since health is a consumption good, these effects increase welfare. We call these outcomes positive insurance effects. The dominating effect will determine the welfare outcome for the entire economy. Our result implies that the positive insurance effect is dominant so that welfare gains are observed when a payroll tax is used to finance the voucher program.
We also consider a consumption tax and a lump-sum tax as an alternative tax-financing instrument. We find that a voucher system financed by a consumption tax leads to more moderate decreases in aggregate capital stock than a system financed by a payroll tax. Meanwhile, aggregate consumption decreases by a full percentage point more and medical spending increases by six percentage points more than under the payroll tax regime. The intuition is as follows. In the dynamic model with multiple consumption goods, a higher consumption tax results in intratemporal and intertemporal substitution effects. That is, a higher consumption tax increases the price of consumption and moves funds towards savings and medical expenditures, which amplifies the negative efficiency effects. Consequently, we find that the negative efficiency effects dominate the positive insurance effects and therefore all generations born before and after the reform experience welfare losses. However, the consumption tax as a financing instrument dominates the payroll tax in terms of aggregate efficiency but not in terms of welfare. This result points to the fact that it will be crucial to find the correct financing instrument for any such health care reform as different taxes result in vastly different outcomes. Most importantly, it highlights the importance of modelling decisions on health insurance and medical spending together with consumption and savings in a general equilibrium framework. Only such a model will allow us to capture the key dimensions of the dynamic interactions and therefore leads to a more accurate assessment of the effects of a comprehensive health care reform.
Related literature. Our work is connected to different branches of the literature. First, the roots of the health accumulation process in our model can be found in the Grossman literature on health capital and ). Follow-up studies concentrate on examining the theoretical and empirical microfoundations of medical spending (see Grossman (2000) for a review). However, the Grossman literature abstains from matching the models to the stylized facts of health related life-cycle behaviors like insurance take up ratios etc. In an extension of that literature, we incorporate health uncertainty, private insurance choice within a realistic institutional setting in a general equilibrium framework and show that a calibrated version of our generalized Grossman model can match the life-cycle patterns of health expenditures and private health insurance take up ratios in the MEPS data.
A large literature has documented that consumption over the life-cycle follows a hump shape (e.g. see Carroll and Summers (1991) , Deaton (1992) , Kotlikoff (2001) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002) ), which is often referred to as the life-cycle consumption puzzle. The life cycle theory of consumption literature has intensively analyzed different factors that might account for this hump-shape (e.g. Yaari (1965) , Thurow (1969) , Heckman (1974) , Kotlikoff (2001) , Gourinchas and Parker (2002) , Bullard and Feigenbaum (2007) , Hansem and Imrohoroglu (2008), and FernandezVillaverde and Krueger (2007) ). These studies share a common feature in that they leave out medical consumption and only construct life-cycle profiles of non-medical consumption. However, it is well documented that medical consumption represents a significant share of a household's income, especially at the end of the life cycle, and therefore play a crucial role in explaining the overall consumption and savings behavior of households. Our work is complementary to this literature as we focus on developing a model that is capable of matching the life-cycle profiles of medical consumption.
Our paper is also connected to studies on health insurance and precautionary savings with exogenous health expenditure shocks (e.g. see Kotlikoff (1988) , Levin (1995) , Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995), and Palumbo (1999) ). Different from these studies, health expenditures in our model are endogenous and determined together with health insurance and savings.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on incomplete markets macro-models with heterogenous agents started by Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994) . These quantitative models are extensively used to analyze the dynamic effects of fiscal policy including social security and taxation (e.g. see Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu and Jones (1995) , Imrohoroglu (1998), and Conesa, Kitao and Krueger (2009) ). More recent contributions to this literature have introduced health spending shocks as additional source of agent heterogeneity (e.g. see Jeske and Kitao (2009) ). Unlike these studies we treat health expenditures as fully endogenous so that we are therefore able to also account for the important interaction between insurance and health expenditure. This allows us to determine the effects of moral hazard arising from changes in the insurance system. Finally, our paper contributes directly to an emerging macro-health economics literature that connects the literature analyzing health as an investment or consumption good with the literature on stochastic dynamic general equilibrium modelling. Recent work by Suen (2006) , Jung and Tran (2008) , Halliday, He and Zhang (2009 ), Forseca, Michaud, Galama and Kapteyn (2009 ), Feng (2009 ), and Mariacristina, French and Jones (2010 starts to integrate health processes into more realistic life-cycle models for the U.S. These models are primarily used to study policy reforms in more realistic settings. However, these models often fall short in: (i) integrating the demand for health care and health insurance with other aspects of the household decision making process; (ii) taking into account life-cycle behavior of health spending and health insurance; (iii) capturing the interactions between public and private health insurance, and the interactions between insurance markets and other markets in the economy; and (iv) accounting for important institutional details (e.g. tax sheltered employer provided health insurance) in the U.S. health care and insurance sector. We advance this literature by addressing all these points in one unified framework, where we account for an endogenous health accumulation process with health risk, uncertainty about the availability of different types of private insurance contracts, wage income uncertainty, and public insurance programs like social security and Medicare. More importantly, since we explicitly model the role of health we completely endogenize the households' decision on health expenditures and health insurance. Our model also captures the general equilibrium effects of public health insurance on the demand for private health insurance, precautionary savings and health capital accumulation.
We also expand our own study on health savings accounts (Jung and Tran (2008) ) by introducing a more realistic insurance setting (group and individual insurance), income shocks, and transitions.
The latter enables us to perform a complete welfare analysis of the policy reforms.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section introduces a simple two period version of the model. Section 3 presents the fully dynamic model. In section 4 we present the calibration of the model. Section 5 contains the results of our policy experiments and section 6 concludes.
The appendix contains all tables and figures and equilibrium definitions. There is also a technical appendix available on our website that contains the derivations of the welfare measures, solutions to the simple model, and additional details about the model estimation parts using data from MEPS. 2
A simple model
We start off with a simple two period model with health risk and health insurance markets and investigate how individuals deal with this type of risk and how government interventions affect the risk-sharing mechanism. As in any insurance market adverse selection and moral hazard will play a role. However, in a multi-period setting with endogenous health this role is confounded with savings effects and human capital effects that make the multi-period setting more intricate than the simple one period settings of classical insurance papers like Pauly (1968) .
We consider an overlapping generations economy where individuals live for two periods: young and old. Every agent is born with income w i , which is drawn from a known distribution f (w i ).
Agents will receive this income in period one and in period two. Young agents value utility from consumption whereas old agents value utility from consumption and health status. 3 In the second period agents experience a health shock and health expenditures. A private health insurance market is available to insure against such health shocks.
In the first period, agents decide on how much to consume and save and on whether to purchase health insurance to insure against the health shock in the second period. Agent i solves the following maximization problem
where c y i is consumption when young; s i is savings; in i ∈ {0, 1} is the insurance state where in i = 0 indicates that no insurance is bought and in i = 1 indicates that the agent decided to buy insurance; p i is the health insurance premium; w i is the individual income, and z i is the health shock when old.
In the second period the agent derives utility from consumption c o i and health h i . The health capital stock is determined by h i = g(z i , m i ), where z i is an individual specific health shock when old and m i is the amount of medical services consumed. We assume there are two possible health shocks: bad and good,
With probability π the agent suffers a bad health shock z B and with probability (1 − π) her health remains good z G . Let p m denote the price of medical services. Total medical expenditure is p m m i . Total out-of-pocket spending on medical treatments is denoted o (m i ) which is a function of whether the agent bought insurance in the first
where the coinsurance rate ρ is the fraction that the household pays after the insurance pays
(1 − ρ) of total health expenditures. The agent then decides how much to spend on consumption and medical treatments in the second period of her life as follows
We assume a perfectly competitive insurance market, where insurance companies collect actuarially fair premiums to cover their cost so that
We refer to this base model as our benchmark model.
In order to solve the model we assume that preferences follow u (c y ) = (c y )
1−σ when agents are young and old, respectively. The health production function is linear g(z i , m i ) = z × m and human capital is produced by f (h i ) = h θ , where θ can either be 0 or 1.
In the first case health is not productive and therefore only a consumption good and in the second case health is productive and therefore also an investment good. Solving the household problem we obtain the following solutions for agents buying insurance and agents not buying insurance.
We distinguish these agents according to superscript ins i = {I or N I} , where I stands for agents buying insurance and N I indicates agents that do not buy insurance. We assume that θ = 0 and solve the household problem to obtain the following optimal allocation. 4
with ins i = {I or N I} , if not insured. 4 We provide details to the solution in a technical appendix on our website.
Our simple model indicates that there are interactions between the decisions on consumption, savings, insurance, and medical spending. We will discuss these interactions briefly. The maximum willingness to pay p * i depends on the curvature of the value function (i.e. the individual's risk aversion) and the individual's income endowment w i . We find that the willingness to pay for insurance is an increasing function in income due to the dynamic structure of the model. 5 The intuition is as follows. Since the marginal utility of consumption when young is higher for the poor agents than it is for rich, the utility cost of buying health insurance in terms of forgone consumption is much higher. For a given distribution of income, there is a distribution of willingness to buy health insurance. Given a positive insurance premium there will be some agents who optimally choose not to buy insurance and rely on precautionary savings only as their maximum willingness is lower than the premium. Low income agents are less likely to buy health insurance. This implies that over the life-cycle, individuals are less willing to buy health insurance at ages when incomes are low.
As established in previous studies, the presence of health risk and health expenditure uncertainty increases precautionary savings and the demand for health insurance (e.g. see Kotlikoff (1988) , Levin (1995) , Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995) , Palumbo (1999) ). In our model, the demand for health insurance crowds out savings as demonstrated in equation (1). That is, if individuals buy insurance contracts in the private market, they have to give up part of their income when young to pay the market insurance premium p, which directly lowers income and therefore savings. This result is consistent with empirical evidence provided by Gruber and Yelowitz (1999) .
When assuming that individuals face idiosyncratic (bad) health shocks with probability π, the classic issue of adverse selection in insurance markets appears (e.g. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) ).
High risk agents benefit more from buying health insurance and therefore are more willing to buy health insurance while the low risk agents opt out. When insurance companies are not allowed to charge individual specific premiums they have to charge an average premium to everybody and will end up attracting a pool of high risk agents. Consequently, low risk agents self insure via private savings. Therefore young individuals with low health risk are less likely to buy health insurance.
Insurance contract and health expenditure. The existence of a health insurance market 5 A formal proof is available upon request from the authors. In one shot games larger wealth levels decrease the risk premium, so that the willingness to pay for insurance is actually decreasing in income in such environments.
affects an individuals' health expenditure. Insured agents tend to spend more on medical services due to a price substitution effect (moral hazard). Our model captures this channel in equation (2). Individuals consume more medical services ∂m ins i ∂p h < 0 as they face a lower effective price of medical service p h . In addition, our model links the choice on health spending with the dynamic consumption/savings problem. When an agent decides to buy health insurance, the agent saves less when young s I < s NI , which leads to lower savings/interest income when old. Subsequently, due to this income effect or "savings effect", insured agents have less money available to buy health services. However, they are eligible to pay the cheaper price for health services in their second period when the insurance becomes effective. The net effect determines whether medical expenditures will increase or decrease. If the substitution effect is dominant, agents will spend more on medical services in this multi-period setting.
Trade-offs in public health insurance. When private insurance markets fail to provide insurance to all individuals due to adverse selection, the introduction of a universal health insurance voucher program could be welfare improving as it alleviates a market failure. Like any other publicly run program, health insurance vouchers should be evaluated in the context of the trade-off between insurance (equity) and incentives (efficiency). Equity implies a more equal income distribution while efficiency implies minimization of distortionary effects of public health insurance on private insurance choice, health spending, and savings behavior. The existence of this new risk sharing arrangement fundamentally affects individuals' savings, insurance decisions and health spending and also has impacts on the market equilibrium. On one hand, a universal health insurance voucher system creates incentives for all individuals to buy health insurance and therefore offers a possible solution for the coverage problem (insurance). On the other hand, the voucher system carries an inherent incentive problem as it discourages individuals from saving while it also encourages increased spending on health care. The later increases the adverse effects of moral hazard in private health insurance markets and leads to additional efficiency loss (incentives). A good public health insurance program should efficiently trade off insurance and incentives.
Health and labor productivity. That new risk-sharing arrangement affects the market equilibrium and prices, which in turn affects the demand for health care and health capital accumulation. If health is associated with labor productivity then spending on health is an investment good as argued in Grossman (1972b) . The voucher program would therefore directly affect the formation of human capital and influence the overall efficiency of the economy. In our model we can "turn on" the human capital channel by setting parameter θ = 1. The demand for health and the demand for medical services are then given by
Comparing medical spending (3) to medical spending without the human capital effect of health (2) we see that m ins i (θ = 1) > m ins i (θ = 0) . In other words, when health is an investment good (in addition to also being a consumption good), then agents have more incentive to spend higher amounts of medical services and to accumulate more health capital. The new term [−w i ] in the demand equations above captures the additional margin.
Equation ( . In an economy where insurance markets are incomplete, under-investment in health capital could exist for uninsured agents. In such an economy, public intervention to expand health insurance coverage could result in efficiency gains. This channel also influences the tradeoff between equity and efficiency and has implications for welfare. Accounting for this channel is important to judge whether the health insurance voucher program could be a good replacement for the current system.
General equilibrium effects. In a general equilibrium framework, the new risk-sharing arrangement affects the intertemporal allocation of funds, which in turn determines equilibrium market prices such as the wage rate w, interest rates r, and insurance premiums p. Prices feed back on the individual's insurance choice and health spending. The tax financing instruments that are used to finance the voucher program also affect general equilibrium outcomes. The final effects on coverage, medical expenditure, and welfare depend on how these general equilibrium mechanisms play out. In the next section, we therefore develop a full general equilibrium model to explore the full effects of the introduction of health insurance vouchers into the current U.S. health insurance system.
3 Fully dynamic model 6
Demographics
We use an overlapping generations framework. Agents work for J 1 periods and then retire for J −J 1 periods. In each period there is an exogenous survival probability of cohort j which we denote π j .
Agents die for sure after J periods. Deceased agents leave an accidental bequest that is taxed and redistributed equally to all agents alive. The population grows exogenously at an annual net rate n. We assume stable demographic patterns, so that age j agents make up a constant fraction µ j of the entire population at any point in time. The relative sizes of the cohorts alive µ j and the mass of individuals dyingμ j in each period (conditional on survival up to the previous period) can be recursively defined as
where years denotes the number of years modelled for each agent.
Technology and firms
In this economy, there is a continuum of identical firms that use physical capital K and human capital L to produce one type of final good. The final good can be used as either a consumption good c or as medical services m. We do not model the production of medical services m separately.
The price of consumption goods is normalized to one and the price of medical services is denoted p m . Each unit of consumption good can be traded for 1 pm units of medical services. Firms choose physical capital K and human capital L to solve the following profit maximization problem
taking the rental rate of capital q and the wage rate w as given. Capital depreciates at rate δ in each period.
Preferences
Households value consumption c and services s that are derived from health h. Household preferences are described by a utility function u (c, s) where u : R 2 → R is C 2 and satisfies the standard Inada conditions. We assume the following technology for the production of health services that transfers health capital from the current period into health services in the current period,
where f ′ ≥ 0 and f ′′ ≤ 0.
Health and human capital accumulation
Health and human capital evolve over the lifetime of an agent and depend on the agents investment into health.
Health capital accumulation. Agents produce health capital via investments into health denoted as medical expenditure m. We follow Grossman (1972b) and use the following accumulation process for health capital
where h j denotes the current health capital (or health status), h j−1 denotes last period's health capital, m j is amount of medical services bought in the current period, and ε j is an exogenous health shock. Health capital depreciates at rate δ h (j) which is a function of age. The older the agent becomes the faster her health depreciates. Finally, the exogenous health shock ε j follows a
Markov process with transition matrix P . Transition probabilities to the next health state depend on the current health shock ε j so that an element of transition matrix P j is defined as
Human capital accumulation. The endowment process is defined by human capital profile e (j, h j−1 , ǫ j ) which depends on age j, health status at the beginning of the current period h j−1 , and working ability ǫ j . Let
be the conditional probability for age j + 1 working ability being ǫ j+1 when age j working ability is ǫ j . We summarize all such probabilities in Markov matrix Π j .
Health expenditures and insurance arrangements
In our benchmark model, agents can buy medical services to improve their health capital. The total health expenditure that agents have to pay to improve their health capital is p m m j where p m is the price of medical services. Since health shocks are age-dependent and stochastic, total health expenditures are stochastic. 7 To cover their health care cost, agents can buy an insurance contract.
We assume that there are two separate insurance arrangements: private health insurance markets for workers and Medicare for retirees.
Private health insurance for workers. Working agents have two types of health insurance policies available: individual insurance and group insurance. In order to be covered by insurance, agents have to buy insurance one period prior to the realization of their health shock. The insurance policy will become active in the following period (one period contract). Agents in their first period of life are thus not covered by any insurance by construction. We distinguish between three possible insurance states and use insurance state variable in j to indicate what type of health insurance an agent has bought in the previous period, where in j = 0 indicates no insurance, in j = 1 indicates individual insurance, and in j = 2 stands for group insurance.
We also assume that each period an agent has a certain probability to be matched with an employer that provides group insurance which is indicated with indicator variable i GI = 1. If an employer provides group insurance the insurance premium p is tax deductible and insurance companies are not allowed to screen workers. If a worker is not offered group insurance from the employer, i GI = 0, then the worker has the option to buy health insurance in the individual market at premium p (j, h). In this case the insurance premium is not tax deductible and the insurance company screens the worker by age and health status. The probability of being offered group 7 Note that we only model discretionary health expenditures pmmj in this paper so that income will have a strong effect on endogenous total medical expenses. Our setup assumes that given the same magnitude of health shock εj , a richer individual will outspend a poor individual. This may be realistic in some circumstances, however, a large fraction of health expenditures in the U.S. are probably non-discretionary (e.g. health expenditures caused by catastrophic health events that require surgery etc.). In such cases a poor individual could still incur large health care costs. We do not cover this case in the current model. insurance is highly correlated with income, so that the Markov process that governs the group insurance offer probability will be a function of the income class. Let
be the conditional probability that an agent has group insurance status i GI,j+1 in period j +1 given she had group insurance status i GI,j in period j. We collect all conditional probabilities for group insurance status in transition matrix Ω income which has dimension 2 × 2 for each income quantile.
The working household's out of pocket health expenditure can now be summarized as
where γ is the deductible, ρ is the coinsurance rate, p m,Ins is the relative price of health expenditures paid by insured workers, and p m,noIns is the price of health expenditures paid by uninsured workers.
An uninsured worker pays a higher price p m,noIns > p m,Ins . The coinsurance rate ρ is the fraction that the household pays after the insurance company pays (1 − ρ) of the post deductible amount p m,Ins m j − γ. Since households have to buy insurance before health shocks are revealed we assume that working households in their last period j = J 1 already decide to buy into Medicare (e.g.
Medicare Plan B premiums).
Medicare. After retirement all agents are covered by Medicare. The medicare deductible is denoted γ Med . Medicare pays a fixed proportion 1 − ρ M ed of the post deductible amount of health expenditures. The total out of pocket health expenditures of a retiree are
where p m,M ed is the price of health services that retirees with Medicare have to pay. Agents have to pay a Medicare Plan B premium p Med . We assume that old agents j > J 1 + 1 do not purchase private health insurance. 8
Private health insurance companies. Insurance companies satisfy their budget constraint within each period and we allow for cross subsidizing across generations. The constraints are
, and
where ω is a markup factor that determines the profit of the insurance company, 1 {in j (x j )=1} is an indicator function equal to unity whenever agents bought the individual health insurance policy,
is an indicator function equal to unity whenever agents bought the group insurance policy, R is the market after tax interest rate, and x j is a summary vector of states for every agent that will be described later. Profits are redistributed in equal amounts to all surviving agents.
Alternatively, we could discard the profits ("thrown in the ocean") in which case we could think of them as loading costs (fixed costs) associated with running private insurance companies.
Government
The government taxes current workers via a payroll tax and charges Medicare plan B premiums to cover the cost of the Medicare program for retirees. The program is self-financing so that
In addition, the government runs a PAYG Social Security program which is self-financed via a payroll tax so that
Finally, the government taxes consumption at rate τ C and income (i.e. wages, interest income, interest on bequests) at a progressive tax rateτ (ỹ j ) which is a function of taxable incomeỹ and finances a social insurance program T SI (e.g. foodstamps) as well as exogenous government consumption G. The government budget is balanced in each period so that
Government spending G plays no further role. Accidental bequests are redistributed in a lump-sum fashion to all households
whereμ j denotes the deceased mass of agents aged j in time t. An equivalent notation applies for the surviving population of workers and retirees denoted µ j .
Household problem
Age j year old agents enter the period with state vector x j = (a j , h j−1 , in j , ε j , ǫ j , i GI,j ) , where a j is the capital stock at the beginning of the period, h j−1 is the health state at beginning of the period, in j is the insurance state at the beginning of the period, ε j is a negative health shock, ǫ j is positive income shock, and i GI indicates whether group insurance from the employer is available for purchase in this period. Old agents, j > J 1 are retired. They do not experience an income shock anymore and they are assumed to be covered by Medicare. The state vector of a household of age j can be summarized as
For each x j ∈ D (x j ) let Λ (x j ) denote the measure of age j agents with x j ∈ D. The fraction µ j Λ (x j ) then denotes the measure of age-j agents with x j ∈ D with respect to the entire population of agents in the economy.
Workers
Agents are endowed with one unit of time that they supply inelastically to the labor market.
Agents therefore receive income in the form of wages, interest income, accidental bequests, and social insurance. The latter guarantees a minimum consumption level of c. After health shocks are realized, agents simultaneously decide their consumption c j , stocks of capital for the next period a j+1 , and health service expenditures m j . Depending on the realization of the group insurance offer state i GI , an agent chooses the insurance state for the next period.
If the agent is offered group insurance then the agent can choose between in j+1 = {0, 1, 2} , paying premiums of zero, p (j, h) for individual insurance and premium p for group insurance, respectively. If the agent is not offered group insurance, that is i GI,j = 0, then her choice for next period's health insurance is reduced to in j+1 = {0, 1}. The household problem for workers j = {1, ..., J 1 − 1} can be formulated recursively as (6) and (7) where
Variable c j is consumption, a j+1 is next period's capital stock 9 , g is the exogenous growth rate,
is out-of-pocket health expenditure, m j is total health expenditure, R is the gross interest rate paid on assets a j from the previous period and accidental bequests T
Beq j
, T ax j is total taxes paid 10 and T SI j is Social Insurance (e.g. food stamp programs).
The effective wage income is we
is the income tax, andỹ W j is the tax base for the income tax composed of wage income and interest income on assets, interest earned on accidental bequests, and profits from insurance companies minus the employee share of payroll taxes and the premium for health insurance. 11
The Social Insurance program T SI j guarantees a minimum consumption level c. If Social Insurance is paid out then automatically a j+1 = 0 and in j = 0 (the no insurance state) so that Social
Insurance cannot be used to finance savings and private health insurance. 12 Agents can only buy 9 Agents are borrowing constrained, in the sense that that aj+1 ≥ 0. Borrowing constraints can either be modeled as a wedge between the interest rates on borrowing and lending, or a threshold on the minimum asset position. See also Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu and Joines (1998) for a further discussion.
1 0 If health insurance was provided by the employer, so that premiums would be partly paid for by the employer, then the tax function would change to
where ψ is the fraction of the premium paid for by the employer. Jeske and Kitao (2009) use a similar formulation to model private vs. employer provided health insurance. We simplify this aspect of the model and assume that all group health insurance policies are offered via the employer but that the employee pays the entire premium, so that ψ = 0. The premium is therefore tax deductible in the employee (or household) budget constraint. We allow for income tax deductibility of insurance premiums due to IRC provision 125 (Cafeteria Plans) that allow employers to set up tax free accounts for their employees in order to pay qualified health expenses but also the employee share of health insurance premiums.
1 1 We assume that only interest earned on bequests are taxed. The U.S. income tax code contains many provisions that allow for the exclusion of bequests from income taxes.
1 2 The stipulations for Medicaid eligibility encompass maximum income levels but also maximum wealth levels. Some individuals who fail to be classified as 'categorically needy' because they have to much savings could still be eligibile as 'medically needy' (e.g. caretaker relatives, aged persons older than 65, blind individuals, etc.)
We will therefore make the simplifying assumption that before the Social Insurance program kicks in the individual has to use up all her wealth. Jeske and Kitao (2005) follows a similar approach. See also: http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidEligibility for details on Medicaid eligibility.
individual or group insurance if they have sufficient funds to do so, that is whenever
The social insurance program will not pay for their health insurance. In their last working period, workers will not buy private insurance anymore because they become eligible for Medicare when retired.
Retirees
Retired agents are insured under Medicare and by definition do not buy any more private health insurance. The household problem for a retired agent j ≥ J 1 + 1 can be formulated recursively as
s.t.
Note that retired agents cannot buy private health insurance anymore so that in j+1 = 0 by definition.
Health insurance vouchers
In our alternative regime, Medicare is eliminated and the government runs a health insurance voucher program, instead. Households receive a health voucher each period that they can use to buy their basic health insurance coverage. The amount of the voucher depends on the discounted (and mortality adjusted) expected health expenditure of the agent in the next period. We can therefore write the size of the voucher for each agent as a function of the agent state vector
Insurance company
In the model with health vouchers, insurance companies are allowed to charge idiosyncratic premiums that are equal to the expected health spending of the agent in the next period. This premium can be written as
Since premiums p j are paid for by vouchers from the government and the size of the vouchers is equal to the expected future health expenditure of the agent, it has to hold that
Again, insurance companies satisfy their budget constraint within each period. We allow for cross subsidizing across generations.
(
where ω is a markup factor that determines the profit (or loading costs) of the insurance company. We do not model the possible premium reductions from increased competition due to vouchers but instead assume a perfectly competitive insurance market where insurance companies make zero profit. This will underestimate the effects of vouchers on the reduction of insurance premiums and the reduction of health expenditures in general. However, some literature on competition in health insurance and health care markets questions the beneficial effects of increased competition on welfare and health care quality (e.g. Frank and Lamiroud (2008) , Gaynor (2006) , DeFeo and Hindriks (2005) , Bundorf (2003) , Cutler and Reber (1998) ). We therefore assume that the additional cost savings or price reduction effects from vouchers due to increased competition in health insurance markets are small and hence not crucial for our analysis.
Government
The aggregate cost of vouchers is
We assume that vouchers are financed either by a payroll tax τ V , a sales tax on final goods consumption τ C , or a lump-sum tax τ LS . The government budget constraint for the voucher regimes can therefore be expressed as either
Household
Age j year old agents enter the period with state vector x j = (a j , h j−1 , ε j , ǫ j ) , where a j is the capital stock at the beginning of the period, h j−1 is the health state at beginning of the period, ε j is a negative health shock, and ǫ j is positive income shock. The state vector of a household of age j can be summarized as
Workers. The worker's dynamic programming problem is given by
Variable c j is consumption, a j+1 is next period's capital stock, g is the exogenous growth rate,
is out-of-pocket health expenditure, m j is total health expenditure, p (x j ) is the insurance premium, R is the gross interest rate paid on assets a j from the previous period and accidental bequests T
Beq j
, T ax j is total taxes paid, T SI j is Social Insurance (e.g. food stamp programs), τ C is a consumption tax, τ V is special payroll tax, and τ LS is a special lump sum tax. Either τ C , τ V , or τ LS will be active to finance the voucher program.
The effective wage income is we (h j−1 , ǫ j ),τ ỹ W j captures progressive income tax, τ Soc we (h j−1 , ǫ j ) is the payroll tax that the household pays for Social Security, andỹ W j is the tax base for the income tax composed of wage income and interest income on assets and accidental bequests. The Social Insurance program T SI j guarantees a minimum consumption level c. If Social Insurance is paid out then automatically a j+1 = 0.
Retirees. Retired agents are similar to working agents except they lack the working income and are thus not exposed to the income shock. In addition they receive pension payments. They are not enrolled in Medicare anymore.
Parameterization and estimation
We provide definitions of a competitive equilibrium of the benchmark model and the model with vouchers in the appendix. We use a standard numeric algorithm to solve the model. 13 We distinguish two sets of parameters. The first set is estimated independently from our model and based on either our own estimates using data from MEPS or estimates provided by other studies ( Table 1) . The second set of free parameters is chosen so that model-generated data match a given set of targets ( Table 2) . We present the target moments that we match with our model in table 3.
Demographics
One period is defined as 5 years. We model households from age 20 to age 90 which results in J = 14 periods. The annual conditional survival probabilities are taken from U.S. Life-Tables in 2003 and adjusted for period length. 14 The population growth rate for the U.S. was 1.2 percent on average from 1950 to 1997 according to the of Economic Advisors (1998). In the model the total population over the age of 65 is 17.35 percent which is very close to the fraction of 17.4 percent in the Census.
Technology and firms
We impose a standard Cobb-Douglas production technology,
and choose a capital share of α = 0.36 which is a standard value. In our model we pick a capital depreciation rate of δ = 15 percent which is close to standard values in the calibration literature (e.g. Kydland and Prescott (1982) ). The depreciation per period is then 1 − (1 − δ) (years/J) .
Preferences
We choose a Cobb-Douglas type utility function of the form
where η is the intensity parameter of consumption, and σ is the inverse of the intertemporal rate of substitution (or relative risk aversion parameter). We set σ = 2.5 and η = 0.9. In conjunction with the magnitudes of the health shocks this weight ensures that the model matches total health spending and the take-up ratio of health insurance of the different age groups. In addition we assume that health services are produced according to
The annual discount factor β is picked to match the capital output ratio and the interest rate.
It is understood that in a general equilibrium model every parameter affects all equilibrium variables. Here we associate parameters with those equilibrium variables that are the most directly (quantitatively) affected.
Health and the human capital accumulation
The period's health state is produced according to
The productivity parameter φ of the health production function is normalized to unity. This is similar to the production parameter in Suen (2006) for a very similar production function of health.
In addition, and Stratmann (1999) estimate positive effects of medical services on measures of health outcomes. We set ξ = 0.32. We do not have data on these parameters, however these parameters are important in targeting total aggregate health expenditure and the expenditure profile over age, so that we get a good idea about their magnitude by matching the model generated moments to aggregate data.
The relative price of health and consumption can be expressed as p m 1 φξ m 1−ξ , where the term in brackets is the marginal contribution to health of an additional unit of health care. 15 We assume that health depreciates depending on age so that the depreciation rates vary between δ h,j=1 = 0.06 and δ h,j=J = 0.52. These are health depreciation rates over 5 year periods. This choice ensures that health depreciates faster as the agent ages. Hugonnier, Pelgrin and St-Amour 
Transition probabilities
The Markov transition probabilities for income shocks and group health insurance offers are estimated with data from MEPS 2004 and 2005. We estimate efficiency profiles for separate income quantiles and then calculate the transition probabilities of going from one quantile to another conditioning on the age of the worker. We then get estimates for age dependent Markov matrices Π j where j = {1, ..., J 1 } . MEPS data also contains information about whether agents have received a group health insurance offer from their employer. We found that these offers are highly correlated with income so that we estimate the transition probability matrices conditional on the respective income quantile of the agents, which results in matrices Ω income . 
Magnitude of health shocks
We chose the magnitude of the health shocks ε = {−0.01, −0.91} to match the insurance coverage take-up rate (percentage of workers buying health insurance per age group) and the share of medical spending in GDP.
Human capital profile
Effective human capital e (h j−1 , ǫ j ) evolves according to For parameter χ we pick 0.9. We are not aware of any estimates for parameter χ and will therefore conduct sensitivity analysis. We then use parameter θ to determine the degree of the investment good function of health. A parameter θ = 0 indicates that health is a pure consumption good and as such unproductive and θ = 1 indicates that health is also an investment good with strong effects on the formation of human capital.
Health insurance markets 4.5.1 Insurance premiums, deductibles and coinsurance rates
Insurance premiums in the individual markets are dependent on age and the health status. Age is highly correlated with health. We therefore simplify the analysis and assume that insurance companies in the individual market will price discriminate according to age only. We then use a base premium p 0 and exogenous markups for age. Base premiums p 0 will adjust to clear the insurance companies budget constraint (10) . We use data on average premiums provided in The Cost and Benefit of Individual Health Insurance Plans (2005) and estimate the exogenous age dependent premium growth rate g j according to
where u age is an iid random variable with E [u age |age] = 0. The insurance premium is then the base premium times the growth rate, or
We pick coinsurance rate ρ = 34 percent (Suen (2006) uses a coinsurance rate of 25 percent).
Deductibles are endogenous in the model and are expressed as fractions of median income. We impose that the deductible for private health insurance is 1.7 percent of median income. We also relate the private insurance premiums to premiums from Medicare Plan B according to Claxton, Gabel, Gil, Pickreign, Whitmore, Finder, DiJulio and Hawkins (2006) . These parameters result in insurance premiums that are close to the average insurance premium as a fraction of income in the data. All ratios, data and model generated, are reported in table 3.
Price of medical services
In order to pin down the relative price of consumption goods vs. medical services, we use the average ratio of the consumer price index (CP I) and the Medical CP I between 1992 and 2006.
We calculate the relative price to be p m = 1.15. 16 The price of medical services for uninsured agents is higher than for insured agents. Various studies have pointed to the fact that uninsured individuals pay up to 50 percent (and more) higher prices for prescription drugs as well as hospital services (see Playing Fair, State Action to Lower Prescription Drug Prices (2000)). The national average is a markup of around 60 percent for the uninsured population (Brown (2006) ). We therefore pick p m,nIns = 1.55.
Government
Social security taxes are τ Soc = 12.4 percent on earnings up to $97, 500. This contribution is made by both employee and employer. The Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Security tax rate is a little lower at 10.6 percent and has been used by Jeske and Kitao (2009) in a similar calibration. We therefore match τ Soc at 10.6 percent picking the appropriate pension replacement ratio Ψ to be 45
percent. 17 The size of the social security program is then 6 percent of GDP. This is close to the Using the income tax rates of the U.S. income tax of 2005 we follow Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura (2007) and estimate the following equation describing marginal income tax rates
where margT ax (income) is the marginal tax rate that applies when taxable income equals income, and ε is an iid random variable where u income is an iid random variable with E [u income |income] = 0. Variable income is household income normalized with an assumed maximum income level of $400, 000. We then fit equation (27) to the normalized income data. The estimated coefficients for 1 6 Compare: http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost?cu 1 7 Social security transfers are defined as T Soc j (x) = Ψwej (hj−1) and they are the same for all agents. Transfers are a function of the active wage of a worker in her last period of work, so that j = J 1 . In addition we assume that hj−1 is a constant and the same for all agents. We pick it to be equal
, which is the "middle" health state of the health grid vector. Biggs, Brown and Springstead (2005) report a 45% replacement rate for the average worker in the U.S. and Whitehouse (2003) finds similar rates for OECD countries. the tax function are thenβ 0 = 0.3411 andβ 1 = 0.0659 so that the income tax function becomes
where T (taxable income) is total income tax paid. In addition, we impose a lower bound of 0 percent and an upper bound of 35 percent on the marginal income tax rate. In our model, we similarly normalize taxable income of every agent with the maximum income of the richest agent in the economy to get the normalized variable income. We use this normalized income directly in expression (28) to get the marginal tax rate and the sum total of payable income tax for each individual. 18 Since income tax revenue and consumption tax revenue is collected to pay for the social insurance Deductibles are endogenous in the model and are expressed as fractions of average health expenditure. We impose that the Medicare deductible is γ M ed = 6 percent of median income.
Key calibration results
In general we calibrate our model to match U.S. data from MEPS in 2004/2005 unless we indicate another data source. We match several important features of the data including insurance coverage, medical expenditures, and wealth accumulation over the life-cycle.
Number of Insured Workers and Life-Cycle Take-up Ratio. Panel one in figure 2 shows the fraction of insured agents over the life-cycle. We present both insurance take up ratios from the data and from the model. We see that the model slightly overestimates the take up rate of insurance for young workers and underestimates the take-up rate for older workers. Overall, the model generates take up rates over the life-cycle that are very close to the data.
Life-Cycle Medical Expenditures. We match two important measures of medical expenditures; the share of medical spending as a fraction of GDP and life-cycle medical expenditures as 1 8 Another method is to use the tax function estimated in Miguel and Strauss (1994) . 1 9 According to Medicare News from November 2005 the coinsurance rates for hospital services under the Outpatient Prospective Payment System (OPPS) will be reduced to 20% of the hospital's total payment. Overall, average beneficiary copayments for all outpatient services are expected to fall from 33% of total payments in 2005 to 29% in 2006.
Visit: http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/press/release.asp?Counter=1506 fraction of income. First, our model generates total medical expenditures of 10 percent in terms of GDP, which is lower than the reported range of 15 to 17 percent of GDP for the US in 2005 according to Baicker (2006) and Fang and Gavazza (2007) . We think this lower number is justified as we concentrate our analysis on the 20 to 85 year old population which leaves out health care spending for children and teenagers. In addition, we do not model Medicaid. Second, our model also matches the life-cycle pattern of medical expenditure as a fraction of income, which is an increasing function in age (panel two in figure 2 ).
Life-Cycle Wealth. Panel two in figure 2 shows the asset distribution over various age groups.
We see that the model reproduces the hump shaped pattern in the data. The data is from the U.S.
Census in 2000.
Policy experiments and results
After calibrating the model to its initial steady state (see first column in table 4) we introduce a universal health insurance voucher program that insures all workers and also replaces Medicare. In our first experiment we use a payroll tax to finance the voucher program, the program is denoted
Regime 1 in table 4. We find that the introduction of health insurance vouchers together with the elimination of Medicare results in a number of important general equilibrium effects.
Efficiency loss. This universal public health insurance program results in efficiency loss. That is, aggregate capital is reduced by 11 percent and subsequently output is lowered by 3.8 percent.
The decline in capital accumulation is mainly due to disincentives on savings. The agents who are uninsured and had to rely on their own income and savings to cover medical costs have now less incentive to save under the health insurance voucher program. Also, agents are forced to pay higher taxes which reduces their income and therefore lowers savings.
Universal coverage and cost. The introduction of a universal health insurance voucher program completely eliminates the adverse selection problem that plagues private health insurance markets as it is now optimal for every agent to buy health insurance since the voucher covers 100 percent of the premium. In order to finance this program the government has to introduce a new payroll tax τ v in the amount of 8.2 percent. On the other hand, Medicare is abolished so that the Medicare payroll tax drops to zero. The difference between the new payroll tax for vouchers and the old payroll tax for Medicare is about 6 percent and represents a direct measure of the cost of full insurance coverage in the U.S.
Health spending. The microeconomic-based insurance literature predicts that medical spending increases with the introduction of insurance programs due to moral hazard. In contrast, our macroeconomic-based model results are more complex. The effect on medical spending is not driven only by individuals' optimal reaction to relatively "cheaper" medical services but also by general equilibrium effects on savings and consumption. The latter effects are caused by increased payroll taxes and by general equilibrium price and income adjustments. Specifically, a new risk sharing mechanism with health insurance vouchers severely affects individuals' choice of consumption, savings, insurance, and medical services, which in turn affect equilibrium prices such as the wage rate, the rental rate of capital and the insurance premium. These changes in prices feed back into determining household income and the relative resource allocations between consumption and savings. These general equilibrium price substitution and income effects are important determinants of whether individuals end up spending more or less on their health. The final or overall effect of vouchers on medical expenditure therefore depends on how all these effects play out.
Our results indicate that this particular health care reform increases the share of GDP spent on health care by 0.6 percent. Multiple effects are at work. The higher payroll tax creates a very large negative income effect that will decrease spending on health services. However, a large fraction of the population is now newly insured and will increase their health expenditure (moral hazard).
Total health expenditures increase by 1.5 percent. Or in other words, poorer agents end up buying more of the cheaper good.
Welfare. All social insurance programs that are financed by tax revenues face a trade-off between the gains from insurance and the losses created by distortions of incentives. The universal health insurance voucher program is no exception. On one hand, the system creates incentives for all individuals to buy health insurance (insurance effect). On the other hand, the voucher system creates incentive problems as it increases tax rates, discourages individuals to save for self-insurance, and encourages increased health spending (moral hazard) which leads to efficiency loss (incentive effect).
We next explore how these two effects interact in terms of consumer welfare. We calculate transition dynamics of welfare from the status quo equilibrium without vouchers to an equilibrium with universal health insurance vouchers. We then use two welfare measures, the first is compensating consumption as fraction of GDP in each time period and the second is compensating consumption as percentage of lifetime income for each generation. The first measure puts a price tag on the reform as it expresses lost (or gained) consumption in terms of GDP. The second measure identifies the winner or loser generation from the reform. We present details of the welfare measures in a technical appendix that is available from our website. The welfare effects are shown in figure 4 .
The introduction of a universal public health insurance program has two opposing effects on individual welfare. On one hand, public health insurance lowers welfare because of higher tax rates that are required to finance the public program. Higher taxes crowd out savings and therefore lower aggregate capital. On the other hand, the public insurance program provides a mechanism to share health risk across families and age groups, which is welfare improving. In addition, some previously uninsured individuals have now access to cheap health care and are able to increase their health levels.
We find that the voucher program results in an overall welfare gain. This result indicates that the welfare gain resulting from the insurance function of the public voucher program outweighs the welfare loss due to the efficiency loss caused by higher tax rates. This is an interesting result, since the transition graph in figure 3 reveals that aggregate consumption rates drop slightly, however, aggregate health capital levels increase and outweigh the drop in consumption rates. That is, the value of health as a consumption good, outweighs the moderate loss of final consumption goods so that in terms of welfare, agents are better off. It also implies that the current health insurance system does not efficiently trade off insurance and efficiency.
The first panel indicates how much it would cost in terms of GDP to make all agents indifferent between the reform and the status quo. The graph indicates that welfare gains are between 3 and 6 percent of GDP.
The second panel in figure 4 indicates that all the generations born before and after the health care voucher reform would benefit from it. It also shows a non-monotonicity in welfare gains. The generations born before the reform gain between 20 to 30 percent of their lifetime consumption (hence the negative! compensating consumption measures). The generations born after the reform gain roughly 5 percent of their lifetime consumption. These retired agents have higher welfare gain because of two reasons. First, the new public health insurance program crowds out private savings, which results in less capital accumulation and higher interest rates. The retired agents who had made their savings decision based on lower interest rates before become richer due to capital gain. Hence, the unanticipated voucher reform results in increasing interest rates and the general equilibrium wealth effect. The retired agents' savings income go up due to this general equilibrium effect. Second, the retired agents do not work so they have no labor income. Higher payroll tax and negative general equilibrium wage adjustment result no wealth effect. Throughout the analysis we therefore see retired households benefiting more from the reform in welfare terms than ones who are born after the reform.
Somewhat different from studies about privatizing social security using stochastic dynamic general equilibrium models (e.g. see Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) and Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu and Joines (1995) ), our welfare results imply that publicly financed health insurance vouchers lead to welfare gains over a system where workers are either insured by private insurance companies or where workers decide to self insure by increasing their savings rate.
Alternative financing instruments. We next explore the effects of alternative tax financing instruments like a consumption tax (Regime 2) and a lump-sum tax (Regime 3).
Consumption tax: In contrast to the previous experiment (Regime 1: payroll tax), we find a higher rate of capital accumulation when consumption tax is used as a financing instrument (Regime 2) so that steady state capital stock only decreases by 1.7 percent. There are at least two reasons for this. When the government decides to abolish Medicare which is financed by a payroll tax in order to replace it with vouchers that are financed by a consumption tax, the effective price of final consumption goods increases as the consumption tax increases from 5.1 percent in the initial steady state to 18 percent in the new steady state. Agents will start consuming less of the final consumption good and start directing their spending towards medical services. Second, the abolishment of Medicare presents a savings motive as older agents cannot expect to receive cheap healthcare when old. Savings can happen in two forms, either additional investments into health capital or as investments into physical capital. The availability of health insurance, makes the first more attractive, so that the physical savings rate drops slightly below benchmark.
In addition, we find that aggregate health expenditures as a fraction of GDP increase. The logic behind this is that first, the increase in health spending by previously uninsured young agents increases due to moral hazard. Also, since the relative price of the final consumption good in-creases significantly, agents who were previously insured will also increase their health spending.
In addition, the slight drop in output also increases this ratio.
Transitions are presented in figure 5 and welfare results are presented in figure 6 . The graph indicates welfare losses of 2 to 3 percent of compensating consumption as a fraction of GDP for the periods after the reform. This welfare loss is due to the severe drop in final goods consumption rates and a direct consequence of the high sales taxes. When investigating welfare for each generation we do find welfare gains for some generations born and retired before the reform. We already pointed out before that retired generations can partly benefit from sightly higher interest rates which increases their income from savings.
Lump-sum tax: Finally we investigate how a voucher program financed by a lump-sum tax (Regime 3) on all households would affect the insurance vs. efficiency trade-off. Lump-sum taxation is considered less distortive than payroll taxes so that this experiment is almost output neutral. The capital stock only drops by 2.5 percent and output drops by 0.8 percent. However, the redistributive or "insurance" effects are smaller since there is no progressivity built into this type of tax system.
In addition, the negative income effect lowers the consumption possibilities of the agents. Overall we find that the negative effects outweigh the positive effects in terms of welfare (see figure 8 ).
Health Productivity and Human Capital Effect. The new risk-sharing arrangement will also affect capital accumulation and equilibrium prices, which in turn influence the demand for health care and health capital accumulation. If health is associated with labor productivity and spending on health is an investment as argued in Grossman (1972b) , then the formation of human capital will be affected by the voucher program. That is, the voucher system induces individuals to accumulate more health capital as it eliminates the adverse selection problem.
In all our previous experiments we chose health productivity parameter θ = 0 so that we effectively turned off the influence of health on the formation of human capital. Health is therefore only held for its consumption value. Health therefore did not affect income or output via the production process. If, on the other hand, one believes that health can also be an investment good, as it produces more healthy work time, then θ > 0 and health will affect the formation of human capital. This has important consequences for individual household income but also for aggregate output, which in turn has implications on welfare.
We therefore set θ = 1 and recalibrate the model as our new benchmark. We then conduct the same policy experiments that we already described above when θ = 0 and the human capital effect was turned off. We first introduce the universal voucher system financed by a payroll tax (Regime 1), then a consumption tax (Regime 2), and finally a lump-sum tax (Regime 3). We report the results of these experiments in table 5.
In general we find that our results are still valid when the human capital effect is turned on. For
Regime 1 where a new payroll tax finances the vouchers, we again find that the negative income effects due to the higher payroll tax stifles savings, which in turn lowers the new steady state capital stock. However, the human capital effect mitigates the drop in savings somewhat compared to our earlier experiment so that aggregate output drops by less. At the same time the growth in health capital is lower with the human capital effect turned on. The reason is again a general equilibrium effect via wages. As we can see from the transition graph in figure
The differences in the effects between regime 1 with θ = 0 and regime 1 with θ = 1 are small though and the differences in terms of welfare are negligible, compared the two curves in figure 4.
When consumption taxes finance the vouchers, we see that the efficiency results are strengthened.
The savings rate increases marginally by 0.08 percent. This has to do with higher prices for final consumption goods, but also with higher health capital levels. Since higher health capital levels now increase human capital levels, firms will demand more physical capital as it is complementary to human capital in the final goods production process. This channel was absent in our earlier analysis with θ = 0 (no human capital effect of health). We find small efficiency gains as overall output increases by 0.3 percent (when θ = 0, output decrease by 0.7 percent). As every agent holds insurance, health spending increases (moral hazard) which increases the health capital stock. Since health capital is productive, more physical will be accumulated as well due to complementarities in the final goods production process. Overall, the output effect will be magnified. This in turn creates larger income effects. As consumption taxes again rise from 4.6 percent in the benchmark economy to more than 17 percent, agents experience welfare losses despite their better health states.
Regime 3 results change the most when the human capital effect is active. Now the policy reform increase output (efficiency gain). However, the lump-sum tax creates a large enough negative income effect, to decrease welfare for most generations.
Conclusion
In this paper we integrate the Grossman human capital model into a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogenous agents. We show that a calibrated version of our generalized Grossman model is able to generate the life-cycle patterns of average medical expenditures and insurance take-up ratios from the data (MEPS 2004 (MEPS /2005 . Furthermore, we apply our analytical framework to quantify the macroeconomic effects of replacing the current U.S. health insurance system with universal health insurance vouchers. We find that this comprehensive health insurance reform results in important macroeconomic effects. More specifically, our results indicate that the health insurance voucher program seems to be able to insure 100 percent of the U.S. population but fails to control the steady increase in health care expenditures. In addition we find that a consumption tax as a financing instrument for the vouchers dominates a payroll tax in terms of aggregate efficiency but not in terms of welfare. It is therefore crucial to find the correct financing instrument to pay for any such health care reform as different taxes result in significantly different outcomes. Our results highlight the importance of modelling decisions on health insurance and medical spending together with consumption and savings in a general equilibrium framework in order to achive more accurate assessments of the effects of health care or health insurance reforms.
Our results also contribute to the life-cycle theory of consumption. It is obvious that agents are not able to smooth their medical consumption over age to the same extent as they smooth their non-medical consumption. The work horse life-cycle models of consumption and savings abstract from medical consumption and focus on understanding how agents allocate resources to smooth non-medical consumption, i.e. explaining the hump-shape of non-medical consumption over the life-cycle (e.g. see Gourinchas and Parker (2002) and Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007) ).
We argue that it is important to reconcile the distinct patterns of the two life-cycle consumption streams in order to gain a better understanding of how agents allocate their resources on their consumption portfolio of medical and non-medical goods as they get older.
Our modelling framework can also be extended to answer a number of additional important questions regarding the implications of a public intervention in the health care sector. First, what is the optimal mix of voucher taxes to achieve a maximum insurance effect without decreasing efficiency? Second, could vouchers possibly create an insurance gap if the voucher system is underfunded? If voucher payments turn out to be insufficient, then insurance companies would have to operate at a loss when covering certain underfunded risk types. In the extreme this could lead to a complete unravelling of the private health insurance market, where insurance companies would have to drop out of the voucher market. In this case the government would have to provide a public insurance alternative if it wants to maintain high coverage rates. However, then the question of sustainability of such a publicly run system is reintroduced, as this system would face similar problems as Medicaid/Medicare faces today. We will concentrate on these questions in our future research. Third, as labor is inelastic in our model, the tax-financing effects on labor supply via increasing the payroll tax is under-estimating the adverse effects of such a tax increase. This has implications for the resulting welfare effects. Fourth, we do not model the competitive environment that the insurance companies work in and therefore completely abstract from any efficiency gains due to increased competition and monitoring.
In addition, this framework is also suitable to analyze the effects of the health care bill that has recently been passed. Important questions about the financial viability, the effects on the private health insurance market, the effects on the government budget, and the effects on the welfare of U.S.
households can be analyzed using this comprehensive model. We leave these important questions for future work.
Equilibrium with health insurance vouchers
Definition 2 Given the transition probability matrices {P j , Π j } J j=1 , and Ω income , the survival probabilities {π j } J j=1 and the exogenous government policies
, a competitive equilibrium with health insurance vouchers is a collection of sequences of distributions µ j , Λ j (x j ) J j=1 of individual household decisions
, aggregate stocks of physical capital and human capital {K, L} , factor prices {w, q, R} , and insurance premiums {p (x j )} J j=1 such that
solves the consumer problem (23) (b) the firm first order conditions hold 
1%
to match size of Medicare of 2.5%. 
